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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	RIZWAN RAJA, : 19-CV-1328 (AMD)	
4	Plaintiff,	
5	-against- : United States Courthouse	
6	: Brooklyn, New York JOHN W. BURNS AND THE CITY :	
7	OF NEW YORK, : Thursday, March 7, 2019	
8	Defendants. : 2:00 p.m.	
9		
10	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR	
11	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAM K. CHEN,	
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
13	APPEARANCES:	
14	For the Plaintiff: DANIEL L. ACKMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW	
15	222 Broadway 19th Floor	
16	New York, New York 10038 BY: DANIEL L. ACKMAN, ESQ.	
17	Tog the Defendant, NEW YORK CITY LAW DEDARTMENT	
18	For the Defendant: NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION	
19	100 Church Street Room 5-319 New York New York 10007	
20	New York, New York 10007 BY: EMILY K. STITELMAN, ESQ.	
21		
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25	Proceedings recorded by Stenographic machine shorthand, transcript produced by Computer-Assisted Transcription.	

	Proceedings	2
1	(In open court.)	
2	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Civil cause for preliminary	
3	injunction hearing, Docket Number 19-CV-1328, Raja versus	
4	Burns, et al.	
5	Would the parties please state their appearances	
6	for the record.	
7	MR. ACKMAN: Daniel Ackman for the plaintiff,	
8	Your Honor.	
9	THE COURT: Good afternoon.	
10	MR. ACKMAN: Good afternoon, Judge.	
11	MS. STITELMAN: Emily Stitelman for the Office of	
12	the Corporation Counsel for the defendant.	
13	THE COURT: Good afternoon.	
14	MS. STITELMAN: Good afternoon.	
15	THE COURT: So I am presiding for the moment over	
16	this matter, which is actually assigned to Judge Donnelly,	
17	who is in trial because I am on miscellaneous duty today.	
18	So that is how I ended up with this case. I have received	
19	and reviewed the plaintiff's submission which was filed	
20	earlier today.	
21	I assume you got half of it, Ms. Stitelman; is	
22	that right.	
23	MS. STITELMAN: That's right, Your Honor, we have.	
24	THE COURT: All right. And I realize, of course,	
25	you have not had any time to respond in writing but	

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hopefully you had the chance to gather your thoughts on this.

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I'm happy to hear first from the defense on this, although I want to give you my preliminary thoughts on it.

Having reviewed the submission as well as what I consider at least the most relevant case law, I think Mr. Ackman, you're going to have a difficult time convincing me that the temporary restraining order is appropriate in this case. The plaintiff is alleging, in essence, a due process violation based on the absence of a hearing pre his impending suspension, which I gather will take effect tomorrow, from being a registered representative to appear on TLC matters before OATH, O-A-T-H, all capitals, all capital letters; which isn't a license, but Plaintiff has argued it is akin to a license. It was certainly a privilege that is granted to individuals who apply and qualify to represent in a quasi legal lawyeristic fashion, TLC drivers who are appearing before OATH on all kinds of charges and violations.

The quick factual history, as I understand it, is that back in February of 2018, the plaintiff received a letter from John W. Burns, an ALJ, actually the supervising ALJ and a first deputy commissioner for OATH advising Mr. Raja that he was going to be suspended from acting as a nonattorney representative before OATH based on certain

alleged misconduct which is set forth in a letter. And Mr. Raja was advised that the suspension would take place beginning on March 8, 2019, which is today, actually -- oh tomorrow. I'm sorry, tomorrow.

Mr. Raja was also advised that if he wanted to refute these findings of misconduct, that he had to submit a written response to ALJ Burns by March 22, 2019. And also was advised that he should attach any evidence pertinent to that resignation or the charges along with his written submission.

Lastly, Mr. Raja was informed that if he failed to respond by that date, ALJ Burns would render a final determination in the matter and would then bar or then Mr. Raja would be barred or banned from appearing at OATH, except as a respondent.

The reason I say, Mr. Ackman, I think you have a difficult case to argue for a TRO is that the question of due process requirement in situations comparable to this, in fact, many of them involving actual taxicab drivers, some of the case law you cited to in your submission does set forth a three-part test under *Matthew*, this is a Supreme Court case in terms of deciding whether or not there actually is a due-process violation.

And with respect to those three factors, the first one being the interest or the property at interest at stake.

The second one -- let's see, let me pull it out of the report. The second one being the Government's interest, both in terms of the action it takes as well as the additional burden of providing more process, and then the public interest in some general sense.

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It seems to me, just as we found in a number of cases that I have looked at, that while the first factor certainly weighs in Mr. Raja's favor because certainly his livelihood is at risk. The second two factors do not favor a finding of the due-process violation. And it is factually pending because here -- if nothing else -- let me put it this way, I think the remedy he seeks, namely, to stop this action is premature at best, because there is here a structured process. He did receive notice of the charges, and opportunity to respond in writing. It is unclear whether or not he is going to get a hearing after he files But there is clearly as well, at least to my his responses. understanding, the potential for an Article 78 proceeding if he is dissatisfied with whatever happens before OATH.

So in this situation the question becomes whether or not the Government has sufficient interest in promptly suspending him and not adding an additional step of a hearing before suspension, whereas here, he has the potential to get a hearing within roughly three weeks of the initiation of the process and the first notice that he gets.

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looking for at the moment.

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And also a post-depravation remedy to an Article 78 if, in fact, he is terminated from his registered representative status. So I apologize. I am actually searching to make sure I cited *Matthew* criteria correctly. That is what I am

Okay. So the three factors are private interest, risk of erroneous depravation, and the Government's interest. So I misstated it earlier. The Government's interest does incorporate, of course, the public's interest in carrying out whatever action it is. Here it would be the suspension of someone that OATH has decided should not represent individuals before them, as well as the burden that would come with introducing a pre-suspension hearing.

And then the second factor, which I did not address before, is the risk of erroneous depravation. So here the risk of erroneous depravation is mitigated to an extent by the fact that there is a prompt potential hearing or at least an opportunity for Mr. Raja to contest the allegations that have been made against him. And, of course, in his submission before this Court, he claims that all of the allegations are false. And he will have an opportunity to raise his objections and oppose those allegations or claims or accusations with his own statement and evidence. So by way of a longish preamble, that is how I view this matter at the moment.

Let me hear from the City if they would like to add anything further. And then, of course, I will hear from Plaintiff.

MS. STITELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't have much to add to your statement.

You know, recognizing that due process is provided here both in the opportunity to be heard that Plaintiff has at OATH before a final determination is made and then by way of an Article 78 proceeding.

And I do just want to add the vulnerable population that Plaintiff served as a nonattorney representative. These are people who are in what they view is a courtroom, an administrative tribunal and they feel they cannot represent their interest and they're looking for someone to do it for them. So having someone with allegations of misrepresentation, fraud to this vulnerable population is really a concern for the City, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So you are sort of reinforcing the notion that the City has a very significant interest in the integrity of that OATH process and the integrity relatedly of the representative who will be speaking on behave of the TLC, in this case, drivers?

MS. STITELMAN: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And let me also mention before I turn to the plaintiff --

And you can have a seat.

-- that some of the case law that I looked at included the following: The case of -- and I will spell this -- Nnebe, N-N-E-B-E, versus Daus, D-A-U-S, 644 F.3d 147, Second Circuit case from 2011 -- I'm sorry, yes; which was cited by Plaintiff in their request for a TRO. The case of Schneider, S-C-H-N-E-I-D-E-R, PE versus Chandler, PE which is a district court case by Judge Cote in the Southern District, C-O-T-E, reported at 2018 Westlaw 770395.

The case of *Rothenberg*, *R-O-T-H-E-N-B-E-R-G*, again *versus Daus*, *D-A-U-S*, because that person happens to be or was at the time the head of the Taxis Limousine Commission.

481 F -- Federal Appendix 667, Second Circuit case from 2012. And in that case they actually cite and rely on *Nnebe* and address some of the same issues relating to due process claims, amongst other claims, brought by TLC driver relating to suspension or termination due to failed drug tests or convictions, criminal convictions.

Lastly, I looked at *Locurto*, *spelled L-O-C-U-R-T-O versus Safir*, as in Howard Safir, the former police commissioner, S-A-F-I-R, *254 F.3d 154*, which is a Second Circuit Case from 2001. It's worth noting that the *Locurto* case that the issue had to do with termination of the employee -- to the employee. Obviously, arguably more dramatic sanction or action, I guess, by the City. And in

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that case, the Circuit found that the availability of post-depravation proceedings was a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether or not the overall process that was accorded to these employees violated due process. And there in *Locurto* there's similarly a complaint that there was no hearing pre-termination. So I think that case which focused on the availability of Article 78 as being relevant to finding no due-process violation is something that, I think, makes it difficult for the plaintiff to, at least at this stage, prevail on a motion for a TRO.

Okay. So, Mr. Ackman, I will hear from you now.

MR. ACKMAN: Yes. Your Honor has went over a bunch of topics, and I want to say, respectfully, I think even after the correction, Your Honor got Matthews wrong. First of all before you even get -- Matthews is a question of mainly whether you have an exception to the general rule. The general rule is that there should be a hearing before a depravation, some kind of hearing, even though it's a short-term depravation in this case, potentially. We don't know how long the suspension will last. But even there, there should be some kind of hearing and there's no reason to go against the general rule in this case.

As to the *Matthew* factors, Your Honor missed, I think, the most important one but then went back to it, the second factor. The first factor clearly favors the

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plaintiff. The second factor also favors the plaintiff, that's the risk of error, because that is -- the full purpose of some kind of hearing is to minimize error and make not just abstract theories, but to minimize error. We've laid out -- the reason we laid out why the charges against Mr. Raja are so weak is because there's a strong likelihood of error. When you go straight to a suspension without even talking to the victims of suspension, without getting even -- having some kind of interview even with getting his side of the story.

Now, one of the charges, for example, is just self-evidently wrong that they didn't register. We have his registration document.

Another of the charges they provide no evidence at all for and is that they provided a false statement to the tribunal. No evidence whatsoever.

A third charge that he muttered a profane comment under his breath doesn't apply at all because it wasn't in a proceedings, didn't disrupt the proceeding, didn't even disrupt the clerk's action.

So three of the charges before you even get to whether the factual -- if there's any factual basis for the other three, which we, of course, dispute are just self-evidently wrong. So there's obviously a lot of error at work here. And the whole point of a hearing is to

#### 11 Proceedings 1 minimize that chance of error, and that's why the general 2 rule is you have a hearing first. 3 But the other cases you cited I am very familiar 4 with those two. Nnebe, they said you didn't need a 5 hearing -- or that case is now on appeal a second time. You didn't need a pre-depravation hearing for a very specific 6 7 reason, that the driver --8 THE COURT: Let me say this, a pre-suspension 9 hearing, right? 10 MR. ACKMAN: Pre-depravation, I said. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. ACKMAN: Pre-suspension. Same thing. 13 THE COURT: Right. But --14 MR. ACKMAN: You didn't need it in that case for a very specific reason. The driver had been arrested and a 15 16 separate, not a judicial officer, but at least a police 17 officer had made a determination there were probable cause 18 that he committed a crime. It wasn't something determined 19 by the TLC, that was a critical factor in allowing no 20 pre-depravation hearing in Nnebe. That's not at all 21 existing here. We have nothing from any -- on any neutral 22 source charging Mr. Raja with anything. And actually the 23 charges -- there are from arguably the neutral source having

So --

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to do with the registration, are clearly wrong.

THE COURT: But let me just stop you there. I mean, the exact language, as you know from *Nnebe* is, due process does not require in all cases a hearing before the State interferes with the protected interest so long as some form of hearing is provided before an individual is finally deprived of the property interest.

MR. ACKMAN: Right.

THE COURT: And I think that that is relevant when I said pre-suspension versus pre-depravation because right now the process is underway.

MR. ACKMAN: Right.

THE COURT: So all that has happened so far is he has being suspended from March 8th at least until March 22nd, which is less than two weeks. And you are assuming, but you do not know, that he will not get any hearing before there is a final determination. So I will say to you that the second factor, while it weighs to some sense in his favor based on your argument that there is no basis for any of these six charges, although we have only spoken about three and then there is then this risk of error, should, to some extent, or have to be considered in the broader context of what process he is getting before any final depravation occurs.

MR. ACKMAN: Well, there's already going to be depravation started tomorrow, so it's not like -- we're not

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1	trying to I mean, you say this is premature. It's not
2	premature. This thing starts tomorrow.
3	THE COURT: Well, in the due process terms it is.
4	Because we cannot run around all the time in the federal
5	court interfering with a process that exists that will mean
6	for two weeks he might lose his pay
7	MR. ACKMAN: You can
8	THE COURT: and then he not
9	MR. ACKMAN: You certainly can. The general rule
10	is you should have a hearing first. OATH should know this,
11	of all people, and the Court
12	THE COURT: But that does not exist, right?
13	Would you agree with me that it is not OATH's
14	normal practice to give hearings to pre-suspension in all
15	different contexts?
16	MR. ACKMAN: Yes, it is.
17	THE COURT: What about the TLC drivers, they lose
18	their licenses on
19	MR. ACKMAN: No, correct. That that's the one
20	instance where and that's allowed because there's an
21	arrest. But in general cases
22	THE COURT: Or drug test, positive drug test.
23	MR. ACKMAN: Yes, true.
24	But I want to and Rothenberg had to do with the
25	final termination. There was nothing in Rothenberg about

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the pre-depravation hearing or the lack thereof. *Rothenberg* had to do with postconviction hearing with postconviction penalties without --

THE COURT: Understood. I understand there is no risk of -- there is less of a risk of error.

MR. ACKMAN: Much, much, much, much.

Certainly, but as to whether what OATH does normally, yes, taxi drivers are suspended all the time for things that they do, but only after they're convicted of something they do.

The one exception is the arrest and, yes, the drug test. But there the drug test, as *Rothenberg* said, the likelihood of error is much less because supposedly they have this scientific test, and so that at least -- I mean, we have a lot of problems where they do in *Rothenberg*. But that's the premise of it, is that they have a scientific test. They have a criminal charge by a police officer that's been filed in court. You don't have any of that here.

And the reason I talk about three charges is because three of them were just self-evidently false. The other three are based on testimony by drivers, not recent cases, but mostly a few years ago. So it's not like this is something pressing. There's no -- in order to violate the general rule that there should be a hearing prior to a

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depravation, there has to be some pressing reason.

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Now, in *Nnebe* they found it was pressing because the guy stood accused of a criminal act. We have no criminal act here. As to the three charges that are based on affidavits, we have, I would say at worst, neglectful I don't think there's anything wrong with behavior. Mr. Raja's behavior in any event, and his explanations, I think, are perfectly reasonable and -- and -- and accurate, what -- he did nothing wrong in those cases. But even if he did do something wrong, there's no pressing danger to the quote/unquote vulnerable population. No one in this vulnerable population is pressing for Mr. Raja's license to suspended. Just the opposite, if they were here, I think they would say, do not suspend him. Let him work. If the charges against him prove true, then suspend him or do what But there is no pressing need to suspend him now, you will. Judge.

THE COURT: Why not, though? I mean, this system relies on the integrity of these registered representatives and there are allegations that he committed falsehoods, which you dispute. But nonetheless, the TLC and OATH have an interest in protecting the individuals who will appear before them, based on violations of City law, and who will pay Mr. Raja in the interim to represent them. So it seems to me that the Government or the City has adequately

#### 16 Proceedings 1 justified its pre -- or, I'm sorry, it's lack of hearing for 2 suspension or pre-suspension lack of hearing in --3 MR. ACKMAN: Your Honor --4 THE COURT: -- as it has in other cases. And I also want to say that I am not sure the case law stands for 5 the proposition that in our particular case because the 6 7 allegations are weaker than in some, that I could say that 8 OATH is required to give Mr. Raja -- compared to everybody 9 else who falls under the same structure or process a 10 pre-suspension hearing. 11 MR. ACKMAN: There is no everybody else, Judge. 12 They haven't cited any other cases where they've done this. 13 As far as I know this is a unique practice. 14 THE COURT: Again, when you say unique, unique to Mr. Raja or unique to registered representatives? 15 16 I'm not aware of any other instance MR. ACKMAN: 17 where a registered representative was summarily suspended. 18 And the weakness of the charges speak to the second *Matthews* 19 factor, but I submit you don't even get to the Matthews 20 factor until you have some pressing need demonstrated to 21 violate the general rule which is you have a hearing first, 22 then a suspension. Even if it's a very brief hearing, an 23 interview of some kind, you should have some kind of check 24 on the veracity of the charges and then you proceed.

I mean, vou

But then there is other problems.

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said you don't know if he's going to get a hearing. There's no -- I mean, if he was going to get a hearing, presumably they would have said it. They said respond in writing, then we'll discuss -- or they didn't schedule a hearing.

THE COURT: But why should we get involved before that actually gets determined? In other words --

MR. ACKMAN: Well, because it's already been determined.

THE COURT: Well, no. I mean, I do not know if there is going to be a hearing and you do not know if there is going to be a hearing. So the question is why should you not have to wait until after you are denied the hearing and some final determination is made to say, We were denied due process?

MR. ACKMAN: Well, if there's going to be a hearing here, I'm sure my friend will say so. So far, it's a letter, doesn't indicate there's a hearing. Ms. Stitelman has not indicated there's a hearing.

And they didn't just get the papers this morning, by the way. I sent them the papers yesterday so they would have a heads-up. I spoke to him earlier -- not to Ms. Stitelman. She was just assigned later. But the author of the email suspending Mr. Raja, I spoke to him yesterday. I sent him the papers, I think around 6:00 o'clock last night. So they had a -- they could have come in here an

1 said, No, we're giving him a hearing. He's made a mistake.

2 But they're not saying there's a mistake. There's no

3 hearing scheduled. There's nothing in the charging letter

4 or the email about a hearing or the process of the hearing.

5 There's only prospect of a paper record, and that itself is

a constitutional violation based on the failure to allow him

cross-examination.

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Now, certainly you can say it hasn't happened yet, but you can enjoin their suspending him without giving him a proper hearing, which would include testimony and cross-examination. That's in their own rules.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask Ms. Stitelman this: Would you agree, Ms. Stitelman, that if OATH or TLC, I do not know who exactly would be the operating agency, determined that Mr. Raja should lose his privileges as a registered representative without a hearing after he responds in writing, would you agree that that might be a due-process violation?

MS. STITELMAN: I would not. Once the final determination is made, then there is an opportunity to bring an Article 78 in state court to see if there was an error of law. That is exactly what an Article 78 is designed for and it is part of that process for the plaintiff here.

THE COURT: Is it correct that it is not the normal course for registered representatives to be summarily

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1	suspended without a hearing, that Mr. Raja in that regard is
2	unique?
3	MS. STITELMAN: No, not at all. In fact, this is
4	completely in line with both Rule 65RPN or 48RPNY6-25D.
5	THE COURT: Well, hang on a second.
6	MS. STITELMAN: Sure.
7	THE COURT: 65
8	MS. STITELMAN: 48RPNY.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MS. STITELMAN: 6-25D.
11	THE COURT: All right. And what does that say,
12	very slowly?
13	MS. STITELMAN: Sure. Do you want me to read it
14	or summarize it?
15	THE COURT: Sure, whichever.
16	MS. STITELMAN: Okay.
17	THE COURT: I mean, but I do not know how long.
18	Just go slowly.
19	MS. STITELMAN: Okay.
20	So D1 states that, Notwithstanding the provisions
21	of Subdivision C above of this section, the chief
22	administrative law judge may summarily suspend or bar a
23	representative upon a determination that the representative
24	lacks honesty and integrity, and that the lack of honesty
25	and integrity will adversely affect his or her practice

before the tribunal.

Item Number 2 goes on to say that, Any action pursuant to this subdivision be on notice to the representative. After the summary suspension or bar, the representative will be given an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding prescribed by the chief administrative law judge or his or her designee. Factors to be considered in determining whether a representative lacks honesty and integrity include, but are not limited to, considering whether the representative has made false, misleading, or inappropriate statements to parties or tribunal staff.

And then finally the next section, which is E, states that, The decision of the chief administrative law judge or his or her designee under C or D of this section constitutes a final determination, and judicial review of the decision may be sought pursuant to Article 78 of the New York City Civil -- New York Civil Practice Law and Rule.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. STITELMAN: So this provision is designed to provide the process that Plaintiff here claims that he's not getting.

THE COURT: All right. I guess that is what troubles me most, Mr. Ackman, is that there is a process, and your claim is that that process, which has been set forth in those regulations and on its face, applies to any

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#### 21 Proceedings 1 registered representative, not just to Mr. Raja, that that 2 entire structure does not satisfy due process. 3 MR. ACKMAN: Judge, we never denied that there's a 4 rule. We cite the rule in our papers. I think we quote the 5 I can't find where it's quoted, but we're certainly -- and we certainly have a copy of it as an 6 7 exhibit. So we're not denying that there's a rule that says 8 they could do it, but that doesn't make it constitutional. 9 Now, what I did say, and Ms. Stitelman didn't 10 contradict, is that I was not aware of this actually 11 So it's not happening to any registered representative. 12 something they routinely do, even though there's a rule that 13 apparently allows them to do it, assuming the rule's constitutional, which it's not. 14 15 But you are challenging, then, this THE COURT: 16 entire rule. 17 MR. ACKMAN: No, I'm not. I'm challenging it as 18 applied. 19 THE COURT: And the basis, though, for your 20 as-applied challenge is that the second element, namely, the 21 potential for error in Mr. Raja's case is more dire or 22 severe or demonstrable than anyone else?

MR. ACKMAN: That's one basis -- well, I don't know about anyone else because, like I said, I'm not aware of any other case. Certainly there's no reported case. I

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looked to find a reported case. I found none.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ACKMAN: Now, I'm not -- I am saying that there's a -- well, there's a possibility of error because three of the charges immediately on their face are bogus. So that leaves the other three which I think are equally bogus, but not immediately apparent. But it is apparent in this sense that the rule that Counsel just cited doesn't just say they did something wrong, it says that affects their ability to practice before the tribunal.

Now, there's no allegation here that Mr. Raja even if he screwed up an appeal two or three years ago is incompetent for that reason or unable to proceed. Really he's done 20,000 cases in this tribunal. There's complaints on three of them, and they're not even about the cases. They're like to identify himself as a lawyer? His business card says he's not a lawyer. So that guy probably just made a mistake. He thought he was a lawyer because he was wearing a suit and he was talking to drivers about their legal issues which, of course, he's supposed to be doing. So the charges here are flimsy at best, and that increases the likelihood of error. But like I said, you don't get there because you have the general rule, which this Court should apply, unless there's some reason not to and there's no reason not to.

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There's no suggestion here that there's something dire or pressing that I need to suspend him now as opposed to on March 22nd or on March 30th or on May 22nd after they decide what they're going to decide. And there is no -- and we have not heard any statement that there's going to be a hearing. There's no reason to think there's going to be a hearing. If there is a hearing, great, we'll appear at the hearing. But if there's not, this Court should say he cannot be suspended without a hearing. There's nothing wrong with that.

And Article 78, finally, is not a defense. I mean, I know there's *Locurto*, that's kind of a rogue case. The Supreme Court has said in many context and many times when there is a general and routine -- a practice and this is a practice that's codified in a rule, that you do not need -- you do not need to exhaust administrative remedies before going to federal court. Rather you can immediately go to federal court to make sure you're not subject to unconstitutional practices. You might see in *Nnebe*, as Your Honor cited, there's a mention of the Article 78 defense in that case and then it's totally ignored. So the Article 78 defense appears from time to time in Second Circuit cases. It's inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and with other Second Circuit cases.

If you look up like a case called Rivera, I think

that's a Second Circuit case. I don't have the cite book in front of me, but I can try and get it on my computer if you would like, that says Article 78 is not a defense to a deliberate practice.

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THE COURT: But we are not talking about a And I am going to point you to the language in defense. Judge Cote's judicial provisional technique, which I think is quite insightful on this point, and that is the Schneider decision. And in it she said, As for the second factor, the risk of erroneous depravation and the probable value of additional procedures, which is the third factor, Courts consider both the significance of the pre-imposed depravation process. And she cites the case of, a Supreme Court case of Cleveland Board of Education versus Loudermill, L-O-U-D-E-R-M-I-L-L, 470 U.S. 532 at 547, Note 12. It's a case from 1985. And then she goes on to say, In the somewhat analogous situation where a tenured public employee is discharged, the Second Circuit has held that due process did not require a pre-termination hearing before a neutral adjudicator because an Article 78 proceeding constitutes a wholly adequate post-depravation hearing for due-process purposes. And then it cites Locurto, which is a case you are saying is on an outlier or a rogue case, and this is from a 2018 decision by Judge Cote.

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Now, obviously, I recognize it is not the Circuit, but I think her reasoning makes sense, which is what I had said to you earlier, the risk of erroneous depravation is to a large extent mitigated by the fact that he has a pre-depravation process. Maybe not pre-suspension process, but he certainly has pre-final depravation process and that will happen in two weeks. If he avails himself of that process, he will be able to submit some rebuttal to these claims which you say are wholly unfounded and for which you say you have hard proof that they are untrue, whether it is the registration accusation or the statement that he misrepresented himself with a card as a lawyer.

Again, I do not think it is appropriate and I do not adopt your argument that I should consider the factors in a vacuum, namely, what is the risk of erroneous depravation as to Mr. Raja just in his case as opposed to what is the process that is being followed by the City in terms of suspension and then final determination of depravation -- I'm sorry, of termination. And that is why I think Judge Cote is exactly right, that if this process were endless if, for example, or there were no process by which he could appeal the finding or determination of the ALJ in the first instance, I would agree with you, that not just as to Mr. Raja's case but any of the cases brought under the same regime, there could be a due-process violation and it

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would be appropriate for him to take some action to stop that. But here we are talking a clearly defined process that is in the regulation, that is being followed, that he can avail himself of as soon as by March 22nd to oppose the action that is being taken and to refute the claims against him.

MR. ACKMAN: Judge, just because there's a clear defined process in the regulation means nothing constitutionally. In the Harrell case as we cite in our papers, the TLC thousands of times a year were seizing cars. Judge -- I'm forgetting her name -- I forget the name of the judge, but I shouldn't because it was also my case. said all thousands of these as many times as they do it, not only was it in a TLC rule, it was actually in a City statute and she said that statute as applied here is unconstitutional. And so the fact that there's a regulation that is supposedly being followed, which we don't know if it's being followed in any consistent way because there's no reported cases and we haven't heard of any other cases, even though Ms. Stitelman -- you haven't heard of any other cases, we don't know of any other cases, Ms Stitelman doesn't know any, I don't know any, I don't know if Mr. Raja knows any where they're suspended without a hearing, so we don't know what they're doing normally. All we know is what they're doing in this case and that is rife with error

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because they're charging him with not registering when he plainly did register.

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THE COURT: But, again, why is it not enough that he gets to make the exact same argument you are making to me to OATH?

MR. ACKMAN: Because he's going to be suspended for two weeks before he gets to make any argument.

Why -- I think there's -- the shoe is really on the other foot. OATH should have to justify doing something which is violently against the constitutional norm that people that get hearings before they're punished, not after. And it should be -- the -- the burden should be on OATH to say, What fact do we cite here? Can we cite here? Have we ever cited here that says Raja is practicing in a court where he's practiced every day for 14 years and doing thousands upon thousands of cases with nary a peep of any -with no issues of his behavior in any of those cases until a few days ago, what is so pressing that they need to suspend him without a hearing? There's nothing. They don't cite There is nothing. There's nothing they could anything. It's just really bizarre behavior on their part. Just because they have a rule that says they can do it, (A), doesn't mean they can do it because the rule could be unconstitutional as applied, and, (B), doesn't mean they should do it.

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I mean, it's just -- it seems like they've just gone crazy here for some reason that they want to make some kind of example of Mr. Raja citing cases that didn't occur last week, last month, this week, this year. Citing cases that were heard in 2016 and 2017, I think early 2018 in one case, but he did nothing. And some of these affidavits are dated years ago. I don't know when they were actually signed or how they came to anybody's attention, but they certainly did nothing when it happened, assuming they got notice of it. And they certainly did nothing in 2016 when he didn't -- quote/unquote, didn't register. Of course, he They didn't do anything -- if he didn't did register. register, they should have said, Why aren't you registered? That's what they've done other times. They've lost the registration forms. It's just an almost insane act and an unconstitutional act, as well, which is the point here for them to suspend him without taking any -- taking five minutes to ask, Mr. Raja, look. We have this affidavit. What do you have to say about it? Why can't they do that? No reason.

THE COURT: Yes, I think I made myself clear,
Mr. Ackman. My problem now is not about the merits of what
he is going to argue as to why OATH is wrong or TLC is
wrong, but it is your claim of a due-process violation. I
know that you are now saying it is an as-applied challenge,

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but again, even looking at his particular factors, which I am not sure is appropriate, I cannot find that he is going to be irreparably harmed by having to wait two weeks to make his case and because there is actually a process. I do not weigh those *Matthews* factors the same way you do.

Yes, the first factor, pursuing a livelihood, is certainly important. But again, that issue comes up in terms of irreparable harm. It is unfortunate that he is going to lose his salary for two weeks, but that is not necessarily something that cannot be compensated for down the road if, in fact, it is determined that they improperly suspended him and he continues in this lawsuit and you are able to convince, for example, the Court that this is a due-process violation, which I have my doubts about. And if in every case of someone losing their pay for some period of time or even permanently in some cases were enough, then obviously every case involving some termination from work or loss of income would end up being irreparable harm. And that is a factor, obviously, outside of just analyzing the due-process claim. You are seeking a TRO, which is an extraordinary remedy. You are asking me to undo a City process or City finding which leads in two weeks to more process for Mr. Raja. I am not stopping that process, but I am certainly stopping the City from doing what it thinks is appropriate at this time pending review in another 14 days

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or so. That is extraordinary, and I think you are skipping over that fact.

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I also do not agree with you that my weighing of the Matthews factor at the second stage should be so specific to what you say are the merits of his claim in terms of the erroneousness of the depravation. I think as has happened in many cases you make a fair argument that the process that they use, which does not involve a hearing, does not require testing of the scientific sort in drug testing or a conviction where there is a whole criminal process that ensures the reliability to some extent on the result, or at least provides greater support for that, that I agree with you makes the TLC's determination for suspension, summary suspension, certainly more vulnerable on the second factor, the risk of erroneous depravation. not think that that weighs for the City in any way. But I do not think it substantially weighs for the plaintiff because you argue the specific. I would say the process in general, which is what I am looking at, does not necessarily mean that this is going to be a higher risk of erroneous depravation.

In this instance, they have cited six different reasons or bases, it is not just a single incident. You dispute them. At least three of them I think are subject to dispute or debate that involves at least two people claiming

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something happened or did not happen as between your client and some other people. So I do not think the process itself is so fraught with a potential for erroneous depravation, and as I have said before and I do not mean to beat a dead horse, I do think just as Judge Cote found in *Schneider*, the consideration of what the risk is has to be tempered in some ways or viewed in the context of what pre- and post-depravation processes exist. And here while there may not be a pre-suspension process, there certainly is a post-suspension process, certainly a chance for Mr. Raja to respond and then if he disputes the ultimate ruling in an Article 78 proceeding and if he is ultimately permanently or finally terminated as a registered representative.

MR. ACKMAN: Your Honor, may I just respond to a few points?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ACKMAN: You keep saying, Your Honor, two weeks. But there's no two weeks limit here. The Judge says if he doesn't get a response, he will rule on March 22nd. That doesn't mean he's going to rule on March 22nd if he does get a response. The summary suspension could go on --well, we don't know how long.

THE COURT: Agreed.

MR. ACKMAN: So it's not two weeks.

Secondly, the reason I'm arguing a particular fact

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is because that's the only thing we have. If I had a whole series of cases where they consistently got it wrong, or if I have a whole series of cases where they consistently got it right and that they suspended the guy and then determined they were right to suspend him after having a hearing; or on the other hand, if they suspended a guy and then determined they were wrong to suspend him, we don't have other cases. We only have one instance. So that weakens the argument, I grant, as to the likelihood of error. What I do say is that the charges here are so weak that the likelihood of error in this particular case is quite high.

I don't know what the facts are of the *Schneider* case. I'm not familiar with that case, so I can't really argue anything about it. I would like to be able to read that case and may send a letter in.

But I would like to say another case, a 2018 case in this court in this building, *El Boutary*, where they said it was a constitutional violation, which is spelled E-L, second word B-O-U-T-A-R-Y. They said it was a constitutional violation to suspend him, even though they had testimony from passengers. They had a video, because all of that could be challenged and it would properly be challenged before he was suspended. Now, we didn't -- in that case we did not seek a TRO, but the Court ruled that there was a constitutional violation, and then the case was

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soon settled after that. That settlement is public record. So I think -- actually, it's not public -- I'm not sure if it's a public record yet. The fact of the settlement is, I don't know if the -- what the terms of the actual settlement are. But there's a huge likelihood of error. They're going against the general rule. They have no reason to go against the general rule. And then you say he gets a hearing after, but the hearing he's going to get after is constitutionally defective as well in that he's not going to get the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. So the hearing that they are proposing as a remedy to the summary of suspension is itself unconstitutional.

THE COURT: But, again, all of this is premature. I mean, you are asking me to speculate about what process he is going to get after this. And all I am saying is you have to acknowledge is you do not know what is going to happen next and I do not know. But you cannot have me say that before we even know the full measure of the process he is going to get, that it is somehow defective.

I understand that you feel very strongly and will obviously advocate very strongly to OATH that the charges bought against Mr. Raja are flimsy and unsupportable. That makes perfect sense and that strikes me as the way the process ought to work. There is a process and I also want to note that the *El Boutary* case that you just cited does

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say, In determining what process is due, accounts must be taken of the length and finality of the depravation.

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Here you have a suspension that will last some period of time that has yet to be determined and has yet to take effect. But at a minimum of what I do know is that within two weeks, he will be permitted to submit his rebuttal and thereafter there may or may not be a hearing. At that point if he is denied a hearing or if the length of his depravation goes on beyond two weeks, you would have a stronger argument. But these things, it seems to me based on all the case law, seem to operate on some sort of It is not simply that because he did not get a continuum. hearing before, he was deprived in this case of his pay for the next two weeks or his source of income for the next two weeks, it's a due-process violation. And right now I think it is, at minimum, premature to say that there has been a depravation at all of his due-process rights. Or that there has been a violation simply because he said the charges are flimsy.

MR. ACKMAN: But, Judge, as to the prematurity, I don't see how you could even suggest that, Your Honor, with all due respect. First of all, they say it's going to take effect on March 8th. That's tomorrow. I think that if we take them at their word, they don't say might take effect. They say it will take effect. That's tomorrow. It's not

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35 Proceedings 1 premature. 2 Secondly --3 THE COURT: No. As far as it is premature, I was 4 referring to whether or not he is going to get due process 5 here --There's no question --6 MR. ACKMAN: 7 THE COURT: -- the plaintiff has a due-process 8 violation. 9 MR. ACKMAN: Well, I mean, all you need to do is 10 look at their own words. Hence, the reading of the 11 suspension letter, If you wish to refute these findings of 12 misconduct, you must submit to me no later than March 22nd a 13 written response or you may attach any evidence. Then it 14 says, Your written response and submitted evidence will be considered before a final determination is rendered. 15 16 To me that is very clear, they have no plan to 17 have a hearing. They have no plan to allow 18 cross-examination. If they planned to do that, they would 19 have scheduled a hearing for March 22nd or whenever. They 20 would have scheduled a hearing if they wanted to have a 21 hearing. They do that every day. They know how it's done, 22 Judge. 23 THE COURT: If they do not schedule a hearing and 24 they terminate him, then you can come back here and make an 25 argument about the final depravation.

MR. ACKMAN: But it's relevant right now because you said we don't know what's going to happen, but we do know what's going to happen in that they're not going to have a hearing. I mean, they say they're not.

THE COURT: They do not say they are not. They do not say anything. They just say submit something in writing to us by X date.

MR. ACKMAN: Your written response and submitted evidence will be considered. I mean, they don't say, We're not having a hearing, but if they wanted to have a hearing as they've claimed to have a hearing, they would have said so. They would have told their counsel, and she would have said so.

THE COURT: No. But I mean, they do not have to set a hearing because he might not submit anything, or they may consider what he submits not worth having a hearing over. So, yes, there is no guarantee he is going to have a hearing, but there is no guarantee he will not. And that is what you want me to assume. Again, we are talking about a process. I am not convinced, and I know that the centerpiece of your argument is that it is a due-process violation simply not to have a hearing before he gets suspended. I do not agree with that based on the balance within the *Matthews* factors.

I see that, of course, Judge Ross held it in

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El Boutary that, as you say, it is a more extreme situation where you do not have some kind of hearing pre-depravation, but bear in mind the context of that case was long after some kind of suspension that was, in theory, temporary or before more process was given. That case, because of the posture of it, involved a situation where the plaintiff already was, you know, finally deprived of their property interest.

MR. ACKMAN: That's not right, no. In that case he was suspended without a hearing. By the time Judge Ross decided that case, the suspension was over. But she -- what she said was he was entitled to a remedy for the fact there was an unconstitutional suspension. She knew it -- in that case, she knew everything that was going to happen because it had already happened.

THE COURT: And what was the remedy?

MR. ACKMAN: We got damages.

THE COURT: Okay. Why does that make --

MR. ACKMAN: But again --

THE COURT: -- it not irreparable -- well, but again --

MR. ACKMAN: Because -- because the case is a precedent for saying it's unconstitutional to deprive him of a hearing.

THE COURT: But let me address the posture then.

#### 38 Proceedings 1 You have to show me irreparable harm. If he can 2 be compensated for, as I mentioned earlier, any lost 3 wages --4 MR. ACKMAN: Right. THE COURT: -- how can you show irreparable harm? 5 MR. ACKMAN: Well, that -- that -- okay. 6 That --7 I wanted to make clear, that is a separate question and a 8 fair question, but it doesn't make it -- id doesn't say that 9 there's no constitutional violation. But the irreparable 10 harm -- and the Court, the Second Circuit has stated that 11 when there's a constitutional violation, irreparable harm, you don't need to find further irreparable harm. But if you 12 13 did, we have it because not only is he losing his income, 14 he's losing his client relationships, his clients will suffer. 15 16 THE COURT: They can find someone else --Why? 17 MR. ACKMAN: He's -- he's --18 THE COURT: -- to represent them. 19 MR. ACKMAN: They've already posted his name on a 20 list of suspended representatives even before today. 21 THE COURT: And if it is undone, he will be 22 removed from that list. 23 MR. ACKMAN: He will be removed from that list, 24 but meanwhile, people will see he is a suspended guy. He is 25 suspect in some way. The Court doesn't like him.

he -- his client relationships will suffer. His business will end. He cannot do this job somewhere else. This is the only place you could do this job.

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THE COURT: There is no question that during the time he is suspended he will not be able to do this, but I do not think you have shown that he can't restart his business if he actually is not permanently barred from the registration; and nor is this the type of business where somehow there is a lasting effect of temporarily being on the list. His client base, I presume, is ever changing. There are more and more taxi drivers who might need his assistance. He has represented 20,000 people, you say successfully. I just do not accept the notion that somehow this will be the end of his business. And it is not a compensable harm just as happened in El Boutary, so the period that he has been wrongly suspended, he will be compensated should he prevail.

MR. ACKMAN: I'm not so sure you can say that,

Judge. If you have -- because the City will certainly say,

We don't know what he would have made during that time. He

didn't have a right to make it, because he wasn't working.

THE COURT: But that is a calculated difference than his ability to collect it. Just as you said in El Boutary, the Judge decided that he was entitled to damages. I presume he got some measure of damages that the

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#### 40 Proceedings 1 Judge was able to figure out. I actually think it would be 2 quite easy in this situation because you tell me that he has 3 got meticulous records and he has represented 20,000 people, 4 I am sure he had some idea of his yearly salary or even monthly salary. So that does not strike me as a strong 5 6 argument. 7 Again, these are a little premature albeit somewhat of an elusive description, but when it comes to 8 9 irreparable harm, I think it is also applicable. 10 undoubtedly, and I am not minimizing the difficulty it will 11 present to him and his family in terms of making money, but 12 that is certainly true of anyone who loses their job or 13 their employment for a period of time but can get 14 compensated later, because by being reinstated, which hopefully will help if you prevail, or by getting 15 16 compensated for any wrongful --17 If it's a normal job -- he -- he's MR. ACKMAN: 18 called a salary -- he doesn't get a salary. He gets fees 19 from clients. 20 THE COURT: That are documented. I mean, he 21 certainly can tell you how much he made --22 MR. ACKMAN: He can tell you ---- in a given year. 23 THE COURT:

a -- in a -- in the previous two weeks. Yes, certainly he

MR. ACKMAN: He can tell me how much he made in

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can do that.

But what he cannot do is go back to the people who are not -- if you have a salaried job and you lose your job for two weeks, presuming the person paying your salary pays you back pay. There is no back pay here. And that is another factor which --

THE COURT: Well, he is not going to get it from those people. He is going to get it from the defendant if they lose.

MR. ACKMAN: Not all -- it's not --

THE COURT: The whole point is you prove a due-process violation such as found in *El Boutary*, there is a remedy. He gets compensated for the lost wages or earnings he would have made had they not wrongly terminated him or suspended him, right?

MR. ACKMAN: Right. But he doesn't -- there's no way to value the loss to his reputation for being on this list, and he will continue on the list for at least two weeks. Word will get -- it's a small community, Judge. Word gets out. People hear about it. And he shouldn't be on this list before he's had a hearing.

THE COURT: In that regard I think you do not have a strong argument. This is not a business, an ongoing concern where there is some loss of clientele that will be permanent. His is actually a much more fluid business. It

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is incidental that when people all of a sudden have a need to go in front of OATH, they may call him. Once he is off the list, it does not strike me that he is going to be injured in any way in terms of finding new people who never saw the list before, never had a reason to look at the list before. There is a never-ending stream of people he represents. I am sure that is true based on his own experience.

MR. ACKMAN: That is true, Judge. But people will go to the court and see he's not there and will wonder and they'll say, Why aren't you there? And he's says, I was suspended. Why were you suspended? Because they accused me of dishonesty. They didn't give me a hearing. I assure you, I was not dishonest. I mean, the whole idea of these appropriations, that charge is kind of a joke. You know, these people paid him money willingly. He didn't appropriate their money.

THE COURT: I know. You keep going back to the merits, but I am just talking about whether there is going to be such damage to --

MR. ACKMAN: You're right. I'll stick to that point. But the Court of the Second Circuit have said that when there's a constitutional violation, that's enough for irreparable harm. And I'm giving you, the Court, other reasons to find irreparable harm beyond that. I don't think

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you need to go beyond that, just like I don't think you need to go beyond the general rule. But there's reasons that harm is -- irreparable harm doesn't mean you can't, like, ever compensate for it. It means it's hard to value, and the value to his reputation for being on the list, from not being in court for this period of time, which we don't know how long it will be, for being branded a cheat by OATH without a hearing, all of this is ongoing and difficult to value reputational harm and financial harm, that is hard to evaluate and that's why we stop it before it happens. That's what the whole idea of a preliminary injunction is That's why we have TROs. That's why it's a possible remedy, because anything presumably can -- many things can be compensated later, but certain things you want to stop before they happen if you can. And you should do it now because you can, Your Honor, and it's in your jurisdiction. There's no reason not to because he It's within the law. presents no threat to anybody.

The only threat here is the threat to Mr. Raja and his clients because he's unjustly deprived of his livelihood without reason, without hearing, without even being interviewed. That's just not due process, and he's never going to get due process because he's going to get a hearing before a judge who is also the prosecutor. Where do they get that? He's going to get a hearing. He's not going to

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get a hearing at all where we can question the witnesses. They're doing something unconstitutional and defending it by another unconstitutional act that they're going to give him post-depravation relief potentially, but they're never going to give him a fair hearing. They've said it. You should trust them. Take them at their word.

THE COURT: All right.

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Did you want to respond, Ms. Stitelman?

MS. STITELMAN: I have nothing specific further unless you have a question.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me do say this: I mean, with respect to the TRO standard, which is very similar, of course, to a preliminary injunction standard, in theory a plaintiff could establish a basis for injunctive relief or immediate relief shown if there's a serious question as to the merits of his claim. And I guess the question for you is whether or not there is a serious question. Because I think Mr. Ackman, notwithstanding the fact that I have been spending most of my time disagreeing with him or even arguing against his point, certainly does point out what has been found to be a somewhat overly summary process when it comes to the TLC, and obviously El Boutary stands for that, to some extent, because there seems to be this rule that allows for the summary suspension or termination of individuals who come within the purview of

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the commission. And I understand that the rationale, and El Boutary also notes that, is that that kind of process can be suspended where the Government has a significant interest in -- or enough of an interest that it justifies taking these extraordinary measures of denying people rudimentary process before suspending them. And certainly with respect to drivers, that makes a lot of sense because they're out on the street, the potential for harm is immediate and recognizable.

With respect to Mr. Raja's representation of people before an adjudicative body and given the nature of what he has alleged to have done, it is just really a situation where summary process is -- or at least is there not a substantial question here that summary process as applied here violates the due process in some way?

MS. STITELMAN: I think the allegations here specifically with respect to misappropriation of funds, impersonation of an attorney and verbal abuse are serious accusations that affect the workings of the tribunal.

Again, this population is a vulnerable population. In one of the affidavits supporting the misappropriation of funds, it's taking money for a fee and then not doing what they said they said -- he would do, not doing what he said he would do. And that could have long-term consequences for the people that he is representing.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MS. STITELMAN: And so to continue to have this evidence that this is going on, that this -- misappropriation of funds saying, he's an attorney and perhaps they rely on him in a different way, not returning phone calls, acting in this way with this population who may not have the savvy to know that this isn't appropriate, really undermines the way OATH is supposed to work. It can harm them going forward.

THE COURT: Well, I suspect Mr. -- thank you,
Ms. Stitelman. You can have a seat for a second.

I suspect, Mr. Ackman, if you liken Mr. Raja to an attorney, you certainly would agree that the Court would take it quite seriously if there were allegations of misappropriation of funds related to a lawyer and possibly suspend that person pending some further process.

MR. ACKMAN: It's an interesting analogy. It goes exactly the other way. First of all, this is not -- the word "misappropriation" is just used completely wrong. An appropriation of funds is when you take it, even though you're not -- you take it from someone without permission. That's an appropriation. A misappropriation is taking it from someone without permission and it's wrongful. He didn't misappropriate anything. He was paid or fee for a service -- or in two of the cases he was paid a fee for a

service. In one of the cases he wasn't paid at all. I mean, that's his testimony. I think it's at least -- and I'm certainly not arguing the merits. I'm just saying why there's fair chance of error.

The other two cases he couldn't file the appeal because they wouldn't -- he didn't have the tape, and then he made good on it by giving the guy free services following.

In the third case he paid the money back. So there's no misappropriation of funds, and this whole crocodile tears about the vulnerable population, I mean, it's hard to take. Mr. Raja's presence in that court protects that vulnerable population. They were trying to get him out of there without a hearing. That's what hurts the vulnerable population. They're not protecting anybody. They're hurting Mr. Raja. They're hurting his clients because they say one person three years ago who doesn't know what a lawyer is, who doesn't know the difference between a lawyer and a rep said he said he was a lawyer when he gave him a business card that says he's not a lawyer. Please?

This is just -- to say that there's something that Mr. Raja has done when three scattered complaints, which they get out of nowhere to suspend him now immediately without a hearing, that's not due process. That's not the American style of justice.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. If

Mr. Raja gets a hearing, contrary to what you think will
happen in a few weeks after he files his opposition and
nonetheless is terminated as a registered representative,
will you argue in this case that the process was still -- or
rather that he wasn't given due process and assume for a
moment that he can appeal that decision in Article 78?

MR. ACKMAN: If he's given a hearing where he's allowed cross-examination, that will grant me some of the wrongs. Everything they say in the letter, which I trust, I take them at their word at this point, said he's not going to get that kind of hearing. It says, Send us a letter. Send us written submission. We'll decide. No sense of a hearing. No promise.

Will Ms. Stitelman promise that we'll have a hearing on March 22nd? If so, then that part of our case is mooted, but she's not doing that, and they say they won't.

But the other thing is if the hearing is before the judge who is also the prosecutor, that is as plain a day a constitutional violation as you can imagine under both New York Law and Supreme Court *Juris Prudence* from just three years ago. So how can they possibly justify that? So if they go through the process they say they're going through, we certainly will be back here saying it's unconstitutional. If they go through a process that's a

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little bit better, maybe it will be a little better. But the same man as the judge and the advocate? That's unconstitutional, too.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me say this: I am obviously only addressing the request for temporary restraining order, which as I mentioned before, has very strict standards and should only be issued in extraordinary circumstances. Obviously, this is ultimately Judge Donnelley's case and she may view it differently either sooner or later, depending on what happens after today and whether or not there's any additional filings by Plaintiff.

But I am bond to have to say I cannot issue this TRO. And in fact, this conclusion, I think, is bolstered by the very case that Mr. Ackman has pointed me to and is set forth in their submission, and obviously I think it is my conclusion after hearing the argument, and I think quite a good argument from Ms. Ackman and also the argument of the City as well, that this is just not a case where TRO is appropriate at this stage of the process and considering <code>Matthews'</code> factors overall.

So although I will be repeating myself to some extent, let me point out that in *El Boutary*, the decision by Judge Ross, I think she quite relevantly said, and I mentioned this earlier, that in determining what process is

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due, the Court should take a canvas on ranks and the finality of the depravation, and this appears at Page 5 of her opinion. And then she goes on to say and I think this is really quite apt here, For if the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post-suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial.

So as much as you may resist, Mr. Ackman, the notion that this is more of a continuum than a black-and-white situation, I think *El Boutary* does reinforce what I think I have been saying all along, which is that I do have to view this along some sliding scale, if you will, or in the broader context of what process is actually being given. And without myself I think ruling on the merits of the argument that you will be given an opportunity to make to the adjudicative body below, namely, OATH and TLC.

And let me just say this: Then she goes on to discuss the *Pavberg* case which is Judge Dearie's decision that you have also relied upon and there as Judge Ross recounts, Judge Dearie said that the taxi driver's private interest was all the weightier in light of the duration of the summary suspension.

So again, I think all of the precedent that has being cited to me and the decisions of this Court in particular reinforce the notion that there has to be some consideration of what process is being given and how long

not even

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the suspension or depravation is. Right now it has not even taken affect yet.

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Mr. Ackman, you surmise that it could go on for some length of time without a hearing. You may well be But I think right now it would be premature to disallow the City to engage in the process they think is appropriate and summarily suspend him for the next 14 days, at least while he prepares his response. But I fully acknowledge that just as the decision made clear, there is going to be a point in time at which the depravation and the lack of a hearing or the property depravation/suspension and the lack of a hearing will run afoul of the due process requirement and then Mr. Ackman is free to come back here and speak. I think at that point, the preliminary injunction can end the suspension or somehow intervene in that process. And certainly I will confer with Judge Donnelly after today and give her my thoughts on that, and obviously, she will have the benefit of this record.

So to reiterate, at this point I do not find based on the facts of this case and the fact that the three factors of the *Matthews* test show that the plaintiff at this point in time can likely show that there is a constitutional depravation or a constitutional violation, namely due-process violation. While I think there is, of course, a private interest at stake here, namely Mr. Raja's

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livelihood, and I am not taking that lightly, the risks, however, of erroneous depravation, I think is, as I told you, not clear to me, though I think as time goes on there is more concern about that because if there is no hearing, as I mentioned before, I think that is the consideration, Judge Cote's decision in terms of the risk of an erroneous depravation. And at that point there will be both longer suspension or greater depravation and also lack of process, and therefore, a greater risk of error. So that after right

now I think is somewhat neutral.

But the last factor, the Government's interest, at this point I think the Government does have the better of the argument, that they have a systemic interest in trying to police those individuals who represent parties before OATH in TLC matters, and that while in this particular case maybe the claims are wildly egregious, they certainly are serious, namely taking money but not providing a service. So I think that the Government does have an interest in some summary process, but it cannot go on for long without the plaintiff having a right to more process than he is getting now, which is obviously only being able to write his objection.

So that's how I weigh the factors, but I am bound that I cannot say that I find a likelihood of success at this point. But I fully acknowledge that the circumstances

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1	could evolve and change in a way that strengthens
2	Plaintiff's argument because, as I said, have said and I
3	think the case is made clear, all of these factors have to
4	be considered in combination and I think as time goes on and
5	if it goes on without Mr. Raja getting a hearing, then I
6	think it arguably becomes much more potent with respect to a
7	due-process violation.
8	So perhaps, Ms. Stitelman, it is something to take
9	back to your office and the related officers at OATH. To
10	the extent you have any sway over them, I suggest they pay
11	attention to this case because Mr. Ackman is obviously on
12	the warpath right now and is going to continue, I assume, to
13	pursue this case here with the ammunition that he has,
14	namely, some favorable case law in this district and in the
15	Circuit as well, and more particularly, in this court. But
16	the longer this goes on without some process, meaningful
17	process, the stronger his argument gets. All right?
18	MS. STITELMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: So if OATH does not want this Court
20	interfering with what it is doing, it perhaps should hear
21	Mr. Raja out sooner rather than later. All right?
22	MS. STITELMAN: I understand.
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MS. STITELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you both. Thank you,

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    Mr. Ackman.
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               MR. ACKMAN: Thank you, Judge.
                           I certainly appreciate your argument
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               THE COURT:
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     and your advocacy.
               MS. STITELMAN:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, again, to both of you.
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               (Matter concluded.)
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      I (we) certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
     from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
16
                                   8th Day of March, 2019
               <u>/s/ David R. Roy</u>
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                 DAVID R. ROY
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